编者按
在本系列文章中，我们梳理了运筹学顶刊Management Science11月份发布的47篇文章的基本信息，旨在帮助读者快速洞察行业最新动态。本文为第一部分。
● 题目：Discrimination and Economic Expectations
歧视与经济期望
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02276
● 作者：William Bazley, Yosef Bonaparte, George Korniotis, Alok Kumar
● 发布时间：2023.11.1
● 摘要：
This paper examines whether perceptions of discrimination affect the economic expectations of U.S. households. We focus on two forms of expectations that play a central role in economic and financial decisions of households: labor income and inflation. Using experimental data, we demonstrate that discrimination generates greater dispersion in household forecasts. It increases subjective expectations of income uncertainty by 8% and inflation uncertainty by 5%. The impact of discrimination is concentrated among racial/ethnic minorities, inducing 12%–16% greater variation in their income uncertainty expectations and 10%–12% greater variation in their inflation uncertainty expectations. Both psychological and emotional factors appear to influence the discrimination–economic expectations relation.
本文探讨了对歧视的看法是否会影响美国家庭的经济预期。我们重点研究了在家庭经济和财务决策中起核心作用的两种预期形式：劳动收入和通货膨胀。通过实验数据，我们证明了歧视会导致家庭预测更加分散。它使人们对收入不确定性的主观预期增加了 8%，对通货膨胀不确定性的主观预期增加了 5%。歧视的影响主要集中在少数种族/民族中，导致他们对收入不确定性预期的差异增加 12%-16%，对通货膨胀不确定性预期的差异增加 10%-12%。心理和情感因素似乎都会影响歧视与经济预期之间的关系。
● 题目：Information Reliability and Market Outcomes
信息可靠性与市场结果
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03758
● 作者：Chihoon Cho, Richard Frankel, Xiumin Martin
● 发布时间：2023.11.1
● 摘要：
We study the used car market to understand how public enforcement that intends to increase information reliability affects disclosure, pricing, and liquidity. In 1986, federal rules mandated the creation of odometer records, and states enforced the law in a staggered fashion. We find that used car asking-price sensitivity to mileage increases by 32.6%, and mileage disclosure in classified ads increases by 23.4%. The findings suggest that strengthened law enforcement increases odometer credibility and enhances market participants’ use of that information. We also show significant improvement in market outcomes: a 9.7% increase in asking price and a 13.4% increase in transaction speed, as reflected in the reduction in repeated ads. The price effect arises irrespective of whether ads contain mileage disclosure, whereas the liquidity effect arises mainly through disclosure. Our study shows public enforcement can benefit the market by improving information credibility.
我们对二手车市场进行了研究，以了解旨在提高信息可靠性的公共执法是如何影响信息披露、定价和流动性的。1986 年，联邦法规强制要求建立里程表记录，各州以交错的方式执行法律。我们发现，二手车要价对里程数的敏感度增加了 32.6%，分类广告中披露的里程数增加了 23.4%。研究结果表明，加强执法提高了里程表的可信度，并增强了市场参与者对该信息的使用。我们还发现市场结果有了明显改善：要价提高了 9.7%，交易速度提高了 13.4%，这反映在重复广告的减少上。无论广告是否包含里程披露，价格效应都会产生，而流动性效应则主要通过披露产生。我们的研究表明，公开执行可以提高信息可信度，从而有利于市场。
● 题目：When Myopic Managers Must Mark to Market
当目光短浅的管理者必须按市价计价时
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03249
● 作者：Adam Kolasinski, Nan Yang
● 发布时间：2023.11.1
● 摘要：
Although prior research suggests strict, fair value–based securities accounting rules cause banks to sell securities into negative liquidity shocks, a value-destroying behavior called “liquidity feedback trading,” the mechanism is uncertain. We find the sooner chief executive officers (CEOs) are permitted to cash out of their stock and option grants, the more prone are their banks to feedback trading. Furthermore, the sooner CEOs can cash out, the more positive their banks’ stock price reaction to news of accounting rule relaxation. We conclude incentives for managerial short-term focus are a mechanism by which stricter accounting rules cause feedback trading. We also find evidence that regulatory compliance concerns play a role.
尽管之前的研究表明，严格的、以公允价值为基础的证券会计规则会导致银行在流动性受到负面冲击时出售证券，这种破坏价值的行为被称为 "流动性反馈交易"，但其机制尚不确定。我们发现，首席执行官（CEO）越早获准兑现股票和期权授予，其所在银行就越容易进行反馈交易。此外，首席执行官越早套现，其所在银行的股价对会计规则放宽消息的反应就越积极。我们的结论是，管理层短期关注的激励机制是更严格的会计规则导致反馈交易的一个机制。我们还发现有证据表明，监管合规方面的考虑也发挥了作用。
● 题目：Too Much Information: When Does Additional Testing Benefit Schools?
过多信息：何时额外测试对学校有益？
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.01547
● 作者：Vanitha Virudachalam, Sergei Savin, Matthew P. Steinberg
● 发布时间：2023.11.1
● 摘要：
U.S. K–12 school districts that traditionally utilized ongoing “formative” assessments of student progress increasingly rely on additional “interim” assessments to predict student performance on standardized tests. Moreover, some districts are experimenting with merit-based teacher bonuses tied to standardized test scores. We examine the relationship between interim assessments and teacher bonuses using a two-period principal–agent model. The school district (principal), operating under a limited budget, decides whether to implement interim assessments and how much merit pay to offer, and teachers (agents) choose how much effort to exert in each period. We use two-state (proficient versus not proficient) Markovian dynamics to describe the evolution of student test readiness, in which the transition probability in a given period depends on both teachers’ effort decisions and the starting state. Our results indicate that, despite the popularity of interim assessments, their usefulness is far from guaranteed. In particular, the accuracy promised by these assessments is a double-edged sword: positive midyear results can make it easier to incentivize second period teacher effort, but negative results can have a demotivating effect. Moreover, even when an interim assessment does result in a higher probability of the school ending the year in the proficient state, the resulting higher expected costs of merit-based bonuses for the district may exceed the available budget. Thus, even a free interim assessment might be too expensive for the school district.
美国 K-12 学区传统上使用持续的 "形成性 "学生进步评估，但现在越来越依赖于额外的 "中期 "评估来预测学生在标准化考试中的表现。此外，一些学区正在尝试将教师的绩效奖金与标准化考试成绩挂钩。我们采用两期委托代理模型来研究中期评估与教师奖金之间的关系。校区（校长）在预算有限的情况下决定是否实施中期评估以及提供多少绩效工资，而教师（代理人）则选择在每个阶段付出多少努力。我们使用双状态（精通与不精通）动态马尔可夫来描述学生考试准备程度的变化，其中特定时期的状态转移概率取决于教师的努力决策和起始状态。我们的研究结果表明，尽管中期评估很受欢迎，但其实用性远未得到保证。特别是，这些评估所承诺的准确性是一把双刃剑：积极的年中评估结果可以更容易地激励教师在第二阶段的努力，但消极的评估结果可能会起到打击教师积极性的作用。此外，即使中期评估确实提高了学校在年末达到优秀状态的概率，但由此导致的学区绩效奖金预期成本的增加可能会超出可用预算。因此，对学区来说，即使是免费的中期评估也可能过于昂贵。
● 题目：Are Financial Statements More Comparable When GAAP Restricts Managers’ Discretion?
当公认会计准则限制了管理者的自由裁量权时，财务报表是否更具可比性？
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4961
● 作者：Spencer Young
● 发布时间：2023.11.2
● 摘要：
I examine whether financial statements are more comparable when accounting standards restrict managers’ discretion. My evidence suggests that restricting managers’ discretion is associated with reduced comparability, on average. This effect is strongest when transactions are dissimilar. To explore this relation, I develop novel measures of two distinct types of incomparability. I find that restricting managers’ discretion is associated with an increase in incomparability stemming from dissimilar transactions appearing overly similar. Together, these findings suggest that restricting managers’ discretion may be more harmful to comparability than is too much diversity in practice. However, I also find evidence that restricting managers’ discretion may enhance comparability in two scenarios. Specifically, I find that restricting managers’ discretion is associated with improved comparability when standards (1) restrict manipulation of financial reports and (2) eliminate dissimilar accounting treatments that do not reflect differences in the underlying transactions. Overall, these findings nuance our understanding of how the requirements imposed by standard setters influence financial statement comparability.
我研究了当会计准则限制管理者的自由裁量权时，财务报表是否更具可比性。我的证据表明，限制管理者的自由裁量权平均会降低可比性。当交易不同时，这种影响最大。为了探讨这种关系，我对两种不同类型的不可比性制定了新的衡量标准。我发现，限制经理人的自由裁量权会增加因不同交易过于相似而导致的不可比性。这些发现共同表明，在实践中，限制管理者的自由裁量权对可比性的损害可能比过多的多样性更大。不过，我也发现有证据表明，在两种情况下限制经理人的自由裁量权可能会提高可比性。具体来说，我发现在以下两种情况下，限制管理者的自由裁量权与提高可比性有关：（1）限制对财务报告的操纵；（2）消除不能反映基本交易差异的不同会计处理方法。总之，这些发现使我们对准则制定者的要求如何影响财务报表可比性的理解更加细致入微。
● 题目：Optimal Accounting Rules, Private Benefits of Control, and Efficient Liquidation最优会计规则、控制权的私人利益和高效清算
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.03087
● 作者：Xu Jiang, Ming Yang
● 发布时间：2023.11.1
● 摘要：
We study optimal accounting rules that alleviate inefficiencies caused by managerial private benefits. Accounting signals generated by the accounting rules guide the continuation decision at an interim project stage. The entrepreneur enjoys private benefits from continuation, which may induce inefficient decisions. The optimal accounting rule is characterized by a threshold, with a higher threshold representing more conservative accounting. The first-best is achieved under small private benefits. As private benefits increase, the first-best eventually is not achievable and more informative bad news is required for the manager to terminate, resulting in less conservative accounting rules. Therefore, more conservative accounting rules are associated with more efficient investment decisions.
我们研究的最优会计规则可减轻管理者私人利益造成的低效率。由会计规则产生的会计信号会在项目中期阶段为延续决策提供指导。企业家从延续项目中获得私人利益，这可能会导致决策效率低下。最优会计规则有一个临界值，临界值越高，会计越保守。在私人收益较小的情况下，可以达到第一最优。随着私人利益的增加，第一最优最终无法实现，管理者需要得到更多信息量更大的坏消息才会终止，从而导致会计规则更加保守。因此，会计规则越保守，投资决策越有效。
● 题目：Reaching for Yield and the Cross Section of Bond Returns
追求收益率与债券回报率的横截面
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4920
● 作者：Qianwen Chen, Jaewon Choi
● 发布时间：2023.11.6
● 摘要：
Reaching for yield, which we define as an investor preference for higher-yield bonds at a given rating or for higher-rated bonds at given yields, is associated with inflated valuation and thus negatively predicts risk-adjusted returns. Controlling for ratings, alphas are lower for higher-yield bonds, whereas, controlling for yields, alphas are lower for safer-looking, higher-rated bonds. Future bond returns are particularly low when current interest rates are low and demand from yield-reaching investors increases. These bonds experience more frequent downgrades and defaults, suggesting that they are riskier despite their high valuation.
追求收益率（我们将其定义为投资者对给定评级的高收益债券或给定收益率的高评级债券的偏好）与估值膨胀有关，因此会对风险调整后的回报率产生负面预测。在控制评级的情况下，高收益债券的阿尔法值较低，而在控制收益率的情况下，看起来更安全的高评级债券的阿尔法值较低。当当前利率较低，收益率投资者的需求增加时，未来债券回报率尤其低。这些债券经历更频繁的降级和违约，表明它们尽管估值高，但风险更大。
● 题目：Lightning Network Economics: Channels
闪电网络经济学：渠道
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664
● 作者：Paolo Guasoni, Gur Huberman, Clara Shikhelman
● 发布时间：2023.11.6
● 摘要：
Compared with existing payment systems, Bitcoin’s throughput is low. Designed to address Bitcoin’s scalability challenge, the Lightning Network (LN) is a protocol allowing two parties to secure bitcoin payments and escrow holdings between them. In a lightning channel, each party commits collateral toward future payments to the counterparty and payments are cryptographically secured updates of collaterals. The network of channels increases transaction speed and reduces blockchain congestion. This paper (i) identifies conditions for two parties to optimally establish a channel, (ii) finds explicit formulas for channel costs, (iii) obtains the optimal collaterals and savings entailed, and (iv) derives the implied reduction in congestion of the blockchain. Unidirectional channels costs grow with the square-root of payment rates, while symmetric bidirectional channels with their cubic root. Asymmetric bidirectional channels are akin to unidirectional when payment rates are significantly different, otherwise to symmetric bidirectional.
与现有支付系统相比，比特币的吞吐量较低。闪电网络（LN）就是为了解决比特币的可扩展性难题而设计的，它是一种允许双方确保比特币支付和托管持有量的协议。在闪电通道中，每一方都承诺为未来支付给交易对手的款项提供抵押品，而付款则是对抵押品更新的加密担保。通道网络提高了交易速度，减少了区块链拥堵。本文（i）确定了双方建立最佳通道的条件，（ii）找到了通道成本的明确公式，（iii）获得了最佳抵押品和随之而来的节省，（iv）得出了区块链拥堵的隐含减少。单向通道成本随支付率的平方根增长，而对称双向通道则随其立方根增长。当支付率相差很大时，非对称双向通道类似于单向通道，否则类似于对称双向通道。
● 题目：The Stickiness of Category Labels: Audience Perception and Evaluation of Producer Repositioning in Creative Markets
类别标签的粘性：受众对创意市场生产商重新定位的看法和评价
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02070
● 作者：Balázs Kovács, Greta Hsu, Amanda Sharkey
● 发布时间：2023.11.6
● 摘要：
Market producers often seek to position themselves in different categories over time. Successful repositioning is difficult, however, as audiences often devalue offerings that depart from a producer’s past creations. Prior research suggests that this penalty arises as evaluators withhold opportunities for producers to reposition because of presumptions of a lack of competence in different categories. In this paper, we develop understanding of a novel evaluator-driven challenge to producers’ repositioning efforts: evaluators are prone to “categorical stickiness,” by which the categories they have come to associate with a producer through its prior offerings shape their perceptions of the producer’s subsequent offerings. The result is a systematic mismatch between what producers claim and what evaluators perceive when a producer repositions. We further propose that audience members who have the greatest prior experience with a producer are the least likely to recognize its repositioning efforts. We examine evidence for our theory using data from Goodreads.com on authors within the book publishing industry, 2007–2017. We first build a novel deep-learning framework to predict categorization of a given book based solely on an author’s description of its content. We then use data on how Goodreads users categorize and evaluate books as well as their past reading behavior to test for evidence of our proposed mechanism. Overall, our results extend understanding of the evaluative processes that generate categorical constraints and how these may differ among various types of audience members.
随着时间的推移，市场生产者往往会寻求在不同类别中对自己进行定位。然而，成功的重新定位是困难的，因为受众通常会贬低偏离制作者过去创作的产品。先前的研究表明，这种惩罚的产生是由于评价者认为生产商在不同类别中缺乏能力，因而扣留了生产商重新定位的机会。在本文中，我们将进一步了解评价者对生产者重新定位的挑战：评价者很容易受到 "类别粘性 "的影响，他们通过生产者之前的产品所联想到的类别会影响他们对生产者后续产品的看法。其结果是，当制作者重新定位时，制作者所宣称的与评估者所感知的之间会出现系统性的不匹配。我们进一步提出，与制片人有最多合作经验的受众最不可能意识到制片人的重新定位努力。我们使用 Goodreads.com 上 2007-2017 年图书出版业作者的数据来研究我们理论的证据。我们首先建立了一个新颖的深度学习框架，仅根据作者对某本书内容的描述来预测该书的分类。然后，我们利用 Goodreads 用户如何对图书进行分类和评价的数据以及他们过去的阅读行为来检验我们所提出的机制的证据。总之，我们的研究结果拓展了人们对产生分类约束的评价过程以及这些过程在不同类型受众中的差异的理解。
● 题目：Are Third-Party Fundamental Valuations Relevant in Public Company Takeovers?
第三方基本估值与上市公司收购是否相关？
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03249
● 作者：Matthew Shaffer
● 发布时间：2023.11.7
● 摘要：
In U.S. mergers and acquisitions, target directors are required to consider third-party financial valuations, summarized in a “fairness opinion” before accepting a takeover offer. Critics argue (1) that these valuations are not relevant for public companies, which can assess the desirability of the deal based on the market premium, and (2) that the investment bank providers cater to management by “rationalizing” the deal price rather than providing an independent valuation check. I find that fairness valuations can provide valid information about the target’s value, incremental to its predeal stock price. They can impound expected transaction synergies, unravel rumor-driven stock price runups, and may signal ex ante fundamental mispricing. I also find evidence of the alleged catering, which I distinguish from “legitimate” valuation disagreements. This suggests that third-party fundamental valuation could play a useful role in the governance of public company takeovers, but there are flaws in its current implementation.
在美国的并购案中，目标公司的董事在接受收购要约之前必须考虑第三方的财务估值，并在 "公平意见 "中加以总结。批评者认为：（1）这些估值与上市公司无关，上市公司可以根据市场溢价评估交易的可取性；（2）投资银行提供者通过 "合理化 "交易价格来迎合管理层，而不是提供独立的估值检查。我发现，公平估值可以在交易前股价的基础上提供有关目标公司价值的有效信息。它们可以扣押预期的交易协同效应，揭示谣言驱动的股价上涨，并可能预示着事前的基本面错误定价。我还发现了所谓迎合的证据，并将其与 "合理的 "估值分歧区分开来。这表明，第三方基本面估值可在上市公司收购治理中发挥有益作用，但其目前的实施存在缺陷。
● 题目：The Global Determinants of International Equity Risk Premiums
国际股票风险溢价的全球决定因素
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4958
● 作者：Juan M. Londono, Nancy R. Xu
● 发布时间：2023.11.7
● 摘要：
We examine the commonalities in international equity risk premiums by linking empirical evidence for the ability of U.S. downside and upside variance risk premiums (DVP and UVP, respectively) to predict international stock returns with implications from an empirical model featuring asymmetric economic uncertainty and risk aversion. We find that DVP and UVP predict international stock returns through U.S. bad and good macroeconomic uncertainties, respectively. Sixty percent to 80% of the dynamics of the global equity risk premium for horizons under seven months are driven by economic uncertainty, whereas risk aversion appears more relevant for longer horizons. The predictability patterns of DVP and UVP vary across countries depending on those countries’ financial and economic exposure to global shocks. In those with higher economic exposure, investors demand higher compensation for bad macroeconomic uncertainty but lower compensation for good macroeconomic uncertainty, whereas the compensation for bad macroeconomic uncertainty is lower for countries with high financial exposure.
我们将美国下行和上行方差风险溢价（分别为 DVP 和 UVP）预测国际股票回报率能力的实证证据与以非对称经济不确定性和风险规避为特征的实证模型的影响联系起来，研究了国际股票风险溢价的共性。我们发现，DVP 和 UVP 可分别通过美国宏观经济不确定性的好坏来预测国际股票回报率。在 7 个月以下的期限内，全球股票风险溢价动态的 60% 至 80% 是由经济不确定性驱动的，而在更长的期限内，风险规避似乎更为相关。DVP和UVP的可预测性模式因国家而异，取决于这些国家在全球冲击下的金融和经济风险敞口。在经济风险较高的国家，投资者要求对宏观经济不确定性的不利影响给予更高的补偿，但对宏观经济不确定性的有利影响给予的补偿较低，而在金融风险较高的国家，对宏观经济不确定性的不利影响给予的补偿较低。
● 题目：The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization
了解用户需求的挑战：偏好不一致与参与优化
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683
● 作者：Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan
● 发布时间：2023.11.7
● 摘要：
Online platforms have a wealth of data, run countless experiments, and use industrial-scale algorithms to optimize user experience. Despite this, many users seem to regret the time they spend on these platforms. One possible explanation is that incentives are misaligned: platforms are not optimizing for user happiness. We suggest the problem runs deeper, transcending the specific incentives of any particular platform, and instead stems from a mistaken foundational assumption. To understand what users want, platforms look at what users do. This is a kind of revealed-preference assumption that is ubiquitous in the way user models are built. Yet research has demonstrated, and personal experience affirms, that we often make choices in the moment that are inconsistent with what we actually want. The behavioral economics and psychology literatures suggest, for example, that we can choose mindlessly or that we can be too myopic in our choices, behaviors that feel entirely familiar on online platforms. In this work, we develop a model of media consumption where users have inconsistent preferences. We consider a platform which wants to maximize user utility, but only observes behavioral data in the form of the user’s engagement. We show how our model of users’ preference inconsistencies produces phenomena that are familiar from everyday experience but difficult to capture in traditional user interaction models. These phenomena include users who have long sessions on a platform but derive very little utility from it, and platform changes that steadily raise user engagement before abruptly causing users to go “cold turkey” and quit. A key ingredient in our model is a formulation for how platforms determine what to show users: they optimize over a large set of potential content (the content manifold) parametrized by underlying features of the content. Whether improving engagement improves user welfare depends on the direction of movement in the content manifold: For certain directions of change, increasing engagement makes users less happy, whereas in other directions on the same manifold, increasing engagement makes users happier. We provide a characterization of the structure of content manifolds for which increasing engagement fails to increase user utility. By linking these effects to abstractions of platform design choices, our model thus creates a theoretical framework and vocabulary in which to explore interactions between design, behavioral science, and social media.
在线平台拥有丰富的数据，进行了无数次实验，并使用工业规模的算法来优化用户体验。尽管如此，许多用户似乎对他们在这些平台上花费的时间感到后悔。一种可能的解释是激励机制错位：平台没有优化用户的幸福感。我们认为问题更深层次，超越了任何特定平台的具体激励机制，而是源于一个错误的基本假设。为了了解用户想要什么，平台要看用户做了什么。这是一种显性偏好假设，在用户模型的构建过程中无处不在。然而，研究表明，而且个人经历也证实，我们在当下做出的选择往往与我们的实际需求不符。例如，行为经济学和心理学的研究表明，我们可能会无意识地做出选择，或者在选择时过于短视，而这些行为在网络平台上都是司空见惯的。在这项工作中，我们建立了一个用户偏好不一致的媒体消费模型。我们考虑了一个希望最大化用户效用的平台，但该平台只能观察到用户参与形式的行为数据。我们展示了我们的用户偏好不一致模型是如何产生日常经验中熟悉但传统用户交互模型难以捕捉的现象的。这些现象包括：用户在一个平台上停留时间很长，但从中获得的效用却很少；平台变化会稳步提高用户参与度，然后突然导致用户退出。我们模型中的一个关键要素是平台如何决定向用户展示什么内容的表述：平台会根据内容的基本特征对大量潜在内容（内容流形）进行优化。提高参与度是否能改善用户福利取决于内容流形的变化方向：在某些变化方向上，提高参与度会降低用户的幸福感，而在同一流形的其他方向上，提高参与度则会提高用户的幸福感。我们提供了内容流形结构的特征，在这些流形中，增加参与度无法提高用户效用。通过将这些影响与平台设计选择的抽象概念联系起来，我们的模型创建了一个理论框架和词汇表，用于探索设计、行为科学和社交媒体之间的互动。
● 题目：When Bonuses Backfire: Evidence from the Workplace
当奖金适得其反时：来自工作场所的证据
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00484
● 作者：Jakob Alfitian, Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang
● 发布时间：2023.11.7
● 摘要：
Monetary incentives are widely used to align employee actions with employer objectives. We conducted a field experiment in a retail chain to evaluate whether an attendance bonus could reduce employee absenteeism. Apprentices in 232 stores were randomly assigned to a control group or one of two treatment groups in which a monetary or time-off attendance bonus was introduced for one year. We find that neither variant of the attendance bonus led to a systematic reduction in absenteeism. On the contrary, the monetary attendance bonus increased absenteeism substantially by around 50% on average, which corresponds to more than five additional days absent per employee and year. This effect was driven by the most recently hired apprentices. Survey results reveal that the monetary attendance bonus shifted the perception of absenteeism as acceptable behavior. The backfiring effect persisted beyond the end of the experiment, indicating a lasting erosion of social norms.
货币激励被广泛用于使员工的行为与雇主的目标保持一致。我们在一家零售连锁店进行了一项实地实验，以评估考勤奖金是否能减少员工旷工现象。232 家门店的学徒被随机分配到一个对照组或两个处理组中的一个，其中一个处理组引入了为期一年的货币或超时出勤奖励。我们发现，这两种考勤奖金都没有导致缺勤率的系统性下降。相反，货币考勤奖金使缺勤率大幅上升，平均上升约 50%，相当于每位员工每年多缺勤 5 天以上。这种影响主要是由最近聘用的学徒造成的。调查结果显示，货币考勤奖金改变了人们对旷工可接受行为的看法。这种反作用在实验结束后依然存在，表明社会规范受到了持久的侵蚀。
● 题目：Field Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Pricing on Residential Electricity Conservation
定价对居民节电影响的实地实验证据
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.02074
● 作者：Jesse Burkhardt, Kenneth T. Gillingham, Praveen K. Kopalle
● 发布时间：2023.11.7
● 摘要：
This study examines how electric utilities and regulators can encourage residential consumers to conserve electricity during the hottest summer days and shift electricity load from the day to off-peak, nighttime hours. We analyze a two-year field experiment involving 280 Texas households that explores approaches to conservation and load-shifting to enable emission reductions and reduce generation costs. Our critical peak pricing intervention reduces electricity consumption by 14% on the peak hours of the hottest days, leading to greenhouse gas emission reductions of about 16%. A key contribution of this study is the use of high-frequency appliance-level data. We show that 74% of the critical peak response is from reducing air conditioning. In a complementary nighttime pilot program, consumers respond strongly to lower prices by programming the timing of electric vehicle charging. Our work highlights how automation can influence the consumer tradeoffs relating to effort costs, discomfort, monetary incentives, and warm glow.
本研究探讨了电力公司和监管机构如何鼓励居民消费者在最炎热的夏季节约用电，并将白天的用电负荷转移到夜间的非高峰时段。我们分析了一项为期两年、涉及 280 户德克萨斯家庭的实地实验，该实验探索了节约用电和负荷转移的方法，以实现减排并降低发电成本。我们的关键峰值定价干预措施使最热天高峰时段的用电量减少了 14%，从而使温室气体排放量减少了约 16%。本研究的一个重要贡献是使用了高频率的家电数据。我们的研究表明，74% 的关键峰值响应来自于减少空调的使用。在一个补充性的夜间试点项目中，消费者通过对电动汽车充电时间进行编程，对较低的价格做出了强烈反应。我们的工作强调了自动化如何影响消费者在努力成本、不适感、金钱激励和温暖光辉等方面的权衡。
● 题目：Digital Engagement Practices in Mobile Trading: The Impact of Color and Swiping to Trade on Investor Decisions
移动交易中的数字参与实践： 颜色和刷卡交易对投资者决策的影响
● 原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00379
● 作者：Stephanie M. Grant, Jessen L. Hobson, Roshan K. Sinha
● 发布时间：2023.11.8
● 摘要：
As coined by the SEC, Digital Engagement Practices (DEPs) are visual cues and design features to engage investors on mobile trading platforms. With the rise of mobile stock trading, regulators and other capital market participants are concerned that these DEPs may cause retail investors to trade in ways they otherwise would not. Using an experiment, we examine the impact of two common DEPs in mobile trading platforms—color (i.e., the use of green or red to indicate performance) and allowing investors to swipe versus click and confirm to execute trades. Drawing from prior research, we predict that the color associated with firm information will interact with how investors execute their trades to affect investment decisions. Consistent with expectations, results show that investors make the largest investment in a firm when they swipe to trade and firm information is colored green, relative to when they click and confirm to trade or firm information is colored red, holding firm economics constant. Swiping to trade causes investors to focus relatively more on the upside of investing, but only when firm information is colored green and not when it is colored red. The color red leads to a muted effect of swiping to trade as investors experience more negative affect and focus relatively more on the downside of investing. Our study answers calls from regulators and academics to examine the effects of technology on information evaluation in investment decisions, and has important practical implications for investors.
正如美国证券交易委员会（SEC）所称，数字参与实践（DEPs）是在移动交易平台上吸引投资者的视觉提示和设计特征。随着移动股票交易的兴起，监管机构和其他资本市场参与者担心，这些DEP可能会导致散户投资者以他们原本不会采用的方式进行交易。通过一项实验，我们研究了移动交易平台中两种常见的DEPs的影响--颜色（即使用绿色或红色表示业绩）和允许投资者刷卡而不是点击确认来执行交易。根据先前的研究，我们预测与公司信息相关的颜色将与投资者执行交易的方式相互作用，从而影响投资决策。与预期一致的是，结果显示，在公司经济状况保持不变的情况下，当投资者刷卡交易且公司信息显示为绿色时，与点击并确认交易或公司信息显示为红色时相比，投资者对公司的投资最大。刷卡交易会使投资者相对更关注投资的上行空间，但只有当公司信息显示为绿色时才会出现这种情况，而当公司信息显示为红色时则不会。红色会导致刷卡交易的效果减弱，因为投资者会感受到更多的负面影响，并相对更关注投资的负面影响。我们的研究响应了监管机构和学术界的呼吁，研究了技术对投资决策中信息评估的影响，对投资者具有重要的现实意义。